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Abstract 
In industrial clusters, transaction costs are kept low and free riding is discouraged by 
a community mechanism developed through dense and repeated interactions among 
entrepreneurs.  In such environments, new entrants without established reputations and 
connections are put at a distinct disadvantage.  This negative effect on new entry must be 
neutralized for an industrial cluster to expand.  Using enterprise level data from Pakistan, 
this study finds that personal networks are indeed important for successful enterprise 
operation, which works to the advantage of incumbents, but that subcontracting plays the 
role of virtual incubation in nurturing new enterprises, reinforcing the cluster’s dynamism. 
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I. Introduction 
Industrial clusters of micro- and small-sized enterprises (MSEs) producing similar and 
related products abound throughout the world.  Traditional explanations for the advantages 
and ubiquity of industrial clusters center on Marshall’s (1920) hypotheses on information 
spillovers, the division and specialization of labor, and labor pooling.  Recent case studies on 
industrial development in developing countries offer additional explanations.  For example, 
Ruan and Zhang (2009) describe how the division of labor in a cluster eases credit constraints 
faced by small enterprises.  Sonobe et al. (2002) describe how clustering attracts traders, who 
bring trade links to larger markets, while Zhang et al (2011) show the importance of traders 
in providing trade credits and how the shared facilities in clusters can assist financially 
constrained entrepreneurs.  Schmitz (1995), Nadvi (1999a), and Caniëls and Romijn (2003) 
find that collective actions by entrepreneurs in a cluster address the short supply of public 
goods, including knowledge for innovation. 
Clusters have these advantages probably because the geographical proximity among 
entrepreneurs in a cluster helps them to build up trust and norms through dense social 
interactions and repeated transactions (e.g., Becker and Murphy, 1992; Schmitz, 1995, 1999; 
Weijland, 1999; Morosini, 2004; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006).  In other words, a kind of 
community mechanism is developed in clusters, not necessarily based on traditional village 
communities but on profit motives and proximity.  The literature on social capital, however, 
points out that the community mechanism often has negative effects on outsiders (e.g., 
Putnam, 2000; Hayami, 2009).  Biggs and Shah (2006) report this insider-outsider problem in 
the context of small indigenous enterprises in Africa.  If the community mechanism in 
industrial clusters favors insiders, the question arises as to how industrial clusters can grow in 
size by absorbing a number of new entrants.  Some new entrants may have networks, 
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connections, or abundant financial wealth from the beginning and may have no difficulty in 
starting their own businesses.  However, what happens to new entrants who have 
entrepreneurial talent but little social and financial capital?   
This paper is an attempt to contribute to this line of empirical research.  While the 
community mechanism reduces transaction costs in a cluster, it may treat promising new 
entrepreneurs unfavorably, which will lead to the loss of dynamism.  There may, however, be 
a grassroots response to this weakness of the community mechanism.  By using primary data 
collected through face to face interviews with a large number of entrepreneurs producing 
electrical fittings in Pakistan, this paper argues that in industrial clusters, long-established 
manufacturers and traders provide talented start-ups with some type of virtual incubation 
services through a subcontracting system.  It is known that subcontracting saves the start-ups’ 
working capital (Caniëls and Romijn, 2003; Ruan and Zhang, 2009).  We find that 
subcontracting also helps those start-ups with poor endowments of social capital and 
managerial human capital.  Such start-ups acquire management and marketing skills, build up 
personal networks, and accumulate financial wealth through being ‘incubated’ while working 
as subcontractors.1  Since their contractors, as virtual incubators, do not receive any subsidy 
from the public sector, they charge fees to their incubated subcontractor, which take the form 
of the spread between the former’s buying price for the latter’s output and its market price.  
This fee will motivate the latter to graduate from incubation as soon as they are ready to 
conduct business independently. 
                                                 
1 In the economics literature, a business incubator is often defined as a venture providing start-up 
enterprises with physical facilities and business and technical services (Colombo and Delmastro, 
2002; Hackett and Dilts, 2004). What we term virtual incubation involves the provision of the time 
and opportunity for learning by doing, building up personal networks, and accumulating financial 
wealth. 
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There is no shortage of anecdotes about these arrangements in industrial clusters.2  
Probably, the best known anecdotes are provided by economic historians working on the 
proto-industrialization in Western Europe (e.g., Landes, 1969), but they do not provide 
empirical evidence.  The enterprise data that we assembled in the electric fittings cluster in 
Pakistan indicate that social capital is an important factor of successful enterprise operation, 
and that it affects new entrants’ decisions of whether to start an independent enterprise or 
become a subcontractor.  While not a few subcontractors in our sample become independent 
later, the time taken to achieve independence varies considerably.  We examine the manner in 
which the choices of initial enterprise status and the time period of transition from 
subcontractor to independent company depend on connections, networks, general and specific 
human capital, kinship, and financial wealth.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section advances testable 
hypotheses.  An overview of our study site and a descriptive analysis of the data are provided 
in Section 3.  Section 4 attempts to test the hypotheses and checks the results for robustness.  
The summary of the findings is contained in Section 5.  
 
II. Hypotheses 
In general, communities play an important role in contract enforcement in societies in 
which contracts are not expected to be enforced easily in courts (e.g., Hayami, 2009).  In such 
societies, those businessmen who have established good reputations and developed personal 
connections benefit from the community mechanism of contract enforcement, but those 
without good reputations and connections are prone to suffer from the mechanism.  New 
                                                 
2 Among examples are case studies of knitwear clusters in China (Ruan and Zhang, 2009), Vietnam 
(Nam et al., 2010), India (Cawthorne, 1999), and Bangladesh (Mottaleb and Sonobe, 2011), a work 
clothing cluster in Japan (Yamamura et al., 2003), a surgical instrument cluster (Nadvi, 1999b), and a 
soccer ball cluster (Boje and Khan, 2009) in Pakistan. 
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entrants to an industry lack good reputations and connections with their possible transaction 
partners unless they have parents, siblings, or relatives already successful in the industry.  
Thus, most new entrants have difficulty in marketing their products and in buying materials 
on credit, whereas long-established entrepreneurs do not. 
The question arises as to whether new entrants in industrial clusters are insiders or 
outsiders.  They seem to be insiders because they are located near the incumbent enterprises, 
but they also seem to be outsiders because they have not established reputations or 
developed connections.  When an industrial cluster is being formed, there are a swarm of 
new entrants, as the case studies of clusters in Taiwan, Brazil, China and many other 
countries attest to (e.g., Amsden, 1977; Schmitz, 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006).  Such a 
massive entry of new enterprises would not take place if the new entrants were to really face 
a disadvantage in market competition.  Thus, it may well be that industrial clusters tend to 
have an institution that helps new entrants with scarce endowments of social capital.  These 
considerations lead us to a hypothesis that subcontracting, which is observed in a wide range 
of clusters of different industrial sectors in different countries, plays the role of such an 
institution in mitigating the disadvantages of new entrants.   
Probably, this benefit of the mitigated disadvantage would induce subcontractors to 
carefully observe the product quality and delivery date requirements made by their 
contractors.  Because of this incentive given to the subcontractors, the contractors can trust 
them, even if they are new entrepreneurs with no reputation yet to ruin and no connections 
yet to damage.  Similarly, new entrepreneurs with a scarce endowment of general human 
capital (or education), specific human capital (or expertise), or fixed and working capital (or 
access to finance) may face a disadvantage in market competition.  If subcontracting 
mitigates such a disadvantage, subcontractors will be motivated to observe the relational 
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contract with the contractors so as not to lose the benefit of the mitigated disadvantage.  
Thus, as part of the broader hypothesis above, we would like to test the following 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: In industrial clusters, entrepreneurs with unfavorable endowments of social 
capital, human capital, and financial capital are more likely to become subcontractors than 
other prospective entrepreneurs. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate discrete choice models in which the status of an 
enterprise is associated with indicators of the human, financial and social capital of 
entrepreneurs.  In the literature, there is no general consensus about good indicators of social 
capital.  For example, personal networks may be gained at school (Montgomery, 1991; Simon 
and Warner, 1992) or the workplace (Kajisa, 2007), and personal networks of entrepreneurs 
may help them gain access to technical information (Barr, 2000) or to credit (Akoten et al., 
2006).   Extended families and friendships may or may not be critically important for 
business performance (Nabi, 1988; Nadvi, 1999b; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Caniëls and 
Romijn, 2003).  Thus, our empirical model will include variables related to schooling, 
personal networks, and family ties, even though schooling should reflect general human 
capital as well. 
If a subcontractor acquires expertise through learning by doing and develops personal 
connections with material suppliers and potential customers, he will become less dependent 
on the contractor.  If he can also manage to accumulate sufficient financial wealth or gain 
access to credit, he may stop being a subcontractor altogether and start being an independent 
enterprise.  Such a transformation is observed in a wide range of industrial clusters (e.g., 
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Watanabe, 1970; Amsden, 1977; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006).  In this sense, we consider 
subcontracting to be akin to incubation.  Of course, gaining independence is not necessarily 
accompanied by a discrete change in status from a subcontractor to a contractor.  Even after a 
subcontractor becomes independent of the contractor in terms of social capital and financial 
capital, they may continue to transact with each other on an equal footing.  Such a 
relationship may be termed outsourcing rather than subcontracting. 
In many industrial clusters in developing countries, where neither high technology nor 
large investment is required, discrete changes in enterprise status may take place more easily.  
If such a change occurs frequently, one can use it in an empirical study as a proxy for a new 
entrant’s achievement of independence.   With this proxy, we would like to ask what affects 
the time to become independent.  Under our hypothesis of virtual incubation, subcontracting 
helps new entrants to acquire expertise, connections, and access to finance while working as 
subcontractors.  As these resources are accumulated, the probability with which they become 
independent will increase.  This probability, however, will not depend strongly on the initial 
endowments of these resources but rather on general human capital of the entrepreneur as 
measured by their education level: 
 
Hypothesis 2: How soon a subcontractor becomes independent depends less on his initial 
endowments of specific human capital, social capital, and financial capital than on that of 
general human capital.  
 
More resourceful enterprises or entrepreneurs would have better business results.  If 
subcontractors are under incubation, however, their performance may not be affected by the 
resources as much as independent enterprises’ performance.  To substantiate our argument 
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that subcontracting has an aspect akin to business incubation, we would like to test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The performance of an enterprise is more closely associated with the 
entrepreneur’s initial endowment of human capital, personal connections, and financial 
wealth if the enterprise is independent than if it is a subcontractor. 
 
III. Descriptive analysis  
Data collection 
Our study site is a city in Punjab province, 170 km from Lahore, the provincial capital, 
260 km from Islamabad, the country’s capital, and about 50 km from a few interchanges of 
the 347km long Islamabad-Lahore motorway.  Sargodha is not far from the well-known 
industrial districts, Sialkot, Gujrat, and Gujranwara, in Punjab province. 3   The electrical 
fittings produced in Sargodha include electrical switches, dimmer switch for ceiling fan, 
multi-pin sockets, TV and phone sockets, bell pushes, power plugs, pin shoes, bulb holders, 
wire extensions, and related items.  According to UNIDO (2006), Sargodha has about 1,200 
producers and accounts for about 70 per cent of the domestic production of electrical fittings 
in Pakistan.  Other major production sites are Lahore and Karachi, the capital of Sindh 
province and the centre of commerce and manufacturing of the country.   
We conducted a survey of enterprises producing electric fittings in Sargodha from 
August to October 2008.  Neither the Sargodha regional offices of the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics (FBS) nor the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Development Authority 
                                                 
3 Sialkot is known as a major producer of surgical instruments and soccer balls (Nadvi, 1999a,b, 
2008).  Gujrat and Gujranwara are clusters of enterprises producing plastic products, metal products, 
machines, and electric appliances (Nabi 1988; Caniëls and Romijn, 2003). 
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(SMEDA) had a reliable list of electrical fitting enterprises.4   The FBS regional office, 
however, could identify where electrical fittings enterprises were the most densely 
concentrated.  In that area, the union councilors introduced us to 249 electrical fittings 
enterprises.  We conducted personal interviews with 242 entrepreneurs (seven entrepreneurs 
refused to give us information) and obtained reliable data from 232 entrepreneurs on their 
educational and occupational backgrounds, their families, and their enterprises’ history, 
marketing channels, and employment in 2004, 2006, and 2008.  We revisited the same 
enterprises in October and November 2009 and found that 18 enterprises had left the industry 
between the two surveys. 
 
Supply Chain 
According to the respondents, the production of electrical fittings in Sargodha began in 
the late 1960s, when a trader returned from Karachi after acquiring production skills there.5   
He built the first factory of electrical fittings in Sargodha, which was followed by a factory 
built by his relative, who is now the leader of the industry. 6   From these pioneering 
enterprises, a number of spin-off entrepreneurs emerged by establishing their own factories or 
workshops and copying what they had learned from the pioneers.  The increasing number of 
enterprises attracted not only traders of finished products but also suppliers of parts and raw 
materials to Sargodha.  In this way, the electrical fittings cluster was formed.   
The cluster has three types of producers and two types of buyers, as shown in Figure 1.  
The solid arrows indicate the flows of the subcontracting orders.  Companies and local 
traders subcontract the production of finished products to subcontracting workshops.  
                                                 
4 FBS had no list.  SMEDA had a list of only 31 enterprises. 
5 There was a large factory in Karachi named PPI established before the partition.  It supplied 
electrical fittings to government offices (UNIDO, 2006). 
6 The first factory was closed in the late 1970s when the son of the pioneer emigrated from Pakistan. 
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Subcontracting workshops and some companies subcontract the assembly of parts to 
household subcontractors.   These subcontracting orders are usually accompanied by the 
provision of raw materials and parts in kind and, hence, can be called putting-out contracts.   
Both subcontracting workshops and companies produce finished products.  Hence, the 
division of labor between them is not motivated by the comparative advantage arising from 
the difference in technical expertise but by something else.  Here we note some of the 
apparent differences between them.  The companies are relatively large in size, produce a 
variety of products, and engage in both quantitative aspects such as machine and labor 
management and qualitative aspects of production such as the development of designs and 
samples, setting specifications, and product quality.  Companies use brand names to facilitate 
the marketing of their products.  By contrast, subcontracting workshops are small in size, 
specialize in the production of one or two particular products simply following the 
specifications set by their contractors, and do not have their own brand names.  The status of 
an enterprise, however, is not fixed.  Many companies were established initially as 
subcontracting workshops and later upgraded into companies.   
The materials and parts are usually put out to subcontractors; hence, the flow in the 
direction indicated by the solid arrows in Figure 1.  The main bodies of the electrical fittings 
are made of Bakelite, a synthetic material, which is electrically nonconductive and heat-
resistant.  Bakelite powder is heated and melted in a die and pressed into the shape of the die 
cavity by using, in this cluster, a manual pressing machine.  This is the most capital- and 
skill-intensive process.  A small miscalculation in the heating and pressing leads to disfigured 
products with sub-standard strength.  Many companies and subcontracting workshops 
subcontract household subcontractors to fit metal parts, such as tiny pins and springs, in a 
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Bakelite shell manually.  The assembled products are returned to the contractors (that is, the 
companies or the subcontracting workshops) for inspection and packing.   
The dashed arrows in Figure 1 indicate the flow of products from companies and local 
traders to outside traders.  The buyers of finished products are classified into local and 
outside traders, even though the ultimate buyers are consumers.  Local traders maintain retail 
or wholesale shops in the marketplace in Sargodha.  Outside traders buy electrical fittings 
from the local buyers or directly from the companies.  Although the companies are 
independent in that they produce their own products and sell under their own brand names, 
they are not generally independent on the marketing side.  Many of them are dependent on 
the local traders for the marketing of their products. 
 
Institutional environment 
In Pakistan, the entire system of law enforcement is inefficient and corrupt.  
According to the World Bank’s (2000) World Business Environment Survey, Pakistan ranked 
163rd in the world for contract enforcement, and it took 880 days on average to enforce a 
commercial contract in this country.   As a result, trust-based personal ties act as the critical 
element in successful business in Pakistani society (e.g., Ghani and Ashraf, 2005; Zhu, Bhat, 
and Nel, 2005).  According to our respondents in Sargodha, traders supplying raw materials 
do not hesitate to give trade credit to customers (that is, electrical fittings manufacturers) with 
whom they have established a trust relationship, whereas material suppliers ask a customer 
for immediate cash payment if the customer is a new entrepreneur with no introduction from 
the suppliers’ friends.  Also on the marketing side, new entrepreneurs without good 
references are at a disadvantage.  Whom you know, or ‘jan pehchan’ in the local language, 
matters to every businessman in this society.   
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In this cluster, however, even a new unknown person can easily start an electrical 
fittings business by becoming a subcontractor as raw materials are provided by the contractor.  
A subcontractor is required to visit the contractor frequently and discuss the specifications, 
such as design, strength, and weight of products.  If he does so, he can receive orders and 
materials, and moreover, he receives payment usually at the end of every month.  Such 
punctual payment is noteworthy in the light of the generally weak contract enforcement in 
Pakistani society.    The quantity of provided materials as well as the size of production 
commissioned to the subcontractor is small initially, but it increases as a trust relationship is 
established based on repeated transactions.  Moreover, the contractor may give the 
subcontractor a ‘parchi’, a card with the signature of the contractor specifying the type and 
amount of raw materials, with which the subcontractor can procure the specified raw 
materials directly from a material supplier.  Such direct transactions with a material supplier 
provide the subcontractor with an opportunity to be recognized by the supplier and win his 
confidence, which will in turn help the subcontractor to transform into a company. 
  
Basic Statistics 
Among the 232 enterprises visited during the 2008 survey, 76 started as companies and 
156 started as subcontracting workshops, as shown in Table 1.  Our sample does not include 
household subcontractors.  The number of new entrants per decade increased gradually.  The 
table also shows that the initial investment required of a company is much larger than that 
required of a subcontractor.  Table 2 shows that 50 of the 156 enterprises that had started as 
subcontractors became companies.  In 2008, these subcontractor-turned-companies had 
operated for 12.2 years on average since their establishment as subcontractors.  It took them 
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6.6 years on average to become companies.  The other subcontracting workshops were only 
6.0 years old on average, so they still had ample time to become companies.7  
At small enterprises, financial management is often unsound (de Mel et al., 2009).  If 
they do keep records meticulously, many of them are reluctant to show the records to 
strangers for fear of information leakage to tax authorities.  Our respondents in Sargodha 
were extreme in this respect.  They were reluctant to disclose even the prices of their products.  
Thus, we failed to obtain data on sales revenues, value added, and any sorts of profits.  
Although the number of pressing machines by type is easy to count, in fact, many machines 
are not fully used and the type and number of machines are not good indicators of enterprise 
size.   Instead, we find that the average number of workers over busy and slack months is a 
better proxy for enterprise size.  The number of workers, however, captures only the size of 
operation within the enterprise; operations contracted out to subcontractors cannot be 
captured by employment size.  As a supplement, we also use the percentage of production 
value contracted out to subcontractors.  Our respondents agreed to answer questions about 
percentages but not absolute values.  The upper part of Table 2 shows that the subcontractor-
turned-companies are smaller than the companies but larger than the subcontracting 
workshops in terms of these rough indicators of enterprise size.  
During the period under study, the GDP of the Pakistani economy grew at six per cent 
per year, and electrification was making headway.  The demand for electrical fittings grew 
fast, but the production in the Sargodha cluster grew even faster (UNIDO, 2006).  Tables 1 
and 2 indicate that the expansion of the cluster was driven by the entry of new enterprises and 
the increase in subcontracting.  The companies’ average employment size remained constant 
over time, suggesting that in-house production did not increase.  Instead, their subcontracting 
                                                 
7 In 2009, five subcontracting workshops upgraded into companies and they had operated for 6.5 
years on average before their transformation into companies. 
13 
 
ratio increased substantially.  It was traders outside the cluster that marketed the cluster’s 
products in remote areas.  While established companies dealt directly with these outside 
traders, younger companies depended on local traders for marketing to outside traders.  On 
average, direct transactions with outside traders accounted for about 70 per cent of total sales. 
Data on the entrepreneurs’ background attributes are presented in Table 3 by enterprise 
status.  Some enterprises are operated as partnerships.  In such cases, we collected data on the 
most important decision maker among the partners.  The number of years of schooling is our 
measure of general human capital.  The entrepreneurs running companies are the most highly 
educated, followed by the entrepreneurs running subcontracting workshops.8  The next three 
variables are intended to capture specific human capital:  the number of years in which the 
entrepreneur had engaged in marketing before starting his own business (entrepreneurs 
running companies have significantly richer experience in marketing); the number of years in 
which the entrepreneur had engaged in electrical fittings production prior to his current 
business (the vast majority of the owners of the subcontracting workshops and the 
subcontractor-turned-companies used to work as production workers at electrical fittings 
factories or as household subcontractors for several years); and the years of operation, which 
is used as an indicator of management experience.   
Two variables are intended to capture personal connections.  The first is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the entrepreneur’s father is or was in the electrical fittings 
industry and zero otherwise.  The second is the number of the entrepreneur’s friends and 
relatives who were in the electrical fittings industry when the entrepreneur established his 
enterprise.  The company owners have the highest averages of these two variables, followed 
by subcontractor-turned-company owners. 
                                                 
8 Production workers are much less educated.  Less than 40 per cent of them completed primary 
school, and only 10 per cent completed middle school. 
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Because of the respondents’ reluctance to divulge financial information, we do not have 
direct measures of their financial wealth.  Based on the information on the father’s 
occupation, we constructed a dummy variable that is one if the father was a business owner in 
trading or manufacturing, a landlord, a relatively high-ranked government official, or a 
policeman, and zero otherwise.  Persons in these occupations are generally considered to be 
associated with high incomes in Pakistan.  We refer to this dummy variable as the father’s 
occupation dummy and expect it to serve as a proxy for favorable access to finance.  
According to our interviews with the respondents, relatively wealthy entrepreneurs finance 
their initial investments with their own saving and their fathers’ contribution.  By contrast, 
less wealthy entrepreneurs tend to gather small contributions from relatives and friends.  Thus, 
the entrepreneur and his father’s shares of initial investment are expected to serve as a proxy 
for financial capital.   
While we have introduced these variables as proxies of general human capital, specific 
human capital, social capital, or financial capital, it is obvious that they are related to more 
than one type of resource.  For example, while the education level of an entrepreneur is a 
proxy for his general human capital, it is likely to be related also to his family’s financial 
wealth and personal connections.  Similarly, the years of operation may be related to personal 
connections as well as to management experience.  We will pay due attention to this nature of 
the variables when we interpret the estimated coefficient on each variable in the regression 
analysis below.  Although these variables are correlated, their correlation coefficients are far 
below the level that would pose a multicollinearity problem.9     
In our sample of 232 entrepreneurs, 18 entrepreneurs left the industry between the 2008 
and 2009 enterprise surveys.  Two of them operated companies, four operated subcontractor-
                                                 
9 The highest correlation coefficient is 0.36, and the second highest is 0.30. 
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turned-companies, and 12 ran subcontracting workshops.  As shown in the last column of 
Table 3, they had much lower education levels, worked as production workers or household 
subcontractors for longer periods before starting their enterprises, and had a smaller number 
of friends and relatives in the industry than the entrepreneurs remaining in the industry.  Thus, 
their relatively rich experience in the production of electrical fittings did not compensate for 
their relatively poor endowments of general human capital and social capital. 
 
IV. Regression Analyses  
Estimation Results 
In this section, we attempt to test the hypotheses advanced in Section 2.  To test 
Hypothesis 1, we estimate discrete choice models in which the choice of enterprise status is 
associated with the entrepreneur’s characteristics.  The results are presented in Table 4.  
Column (1) reports the estimate of the probit model of the determination of the initial 
enterprise status, that is, whether an enterprise started as a company or as a subcontracting 
workshop.  The estimation uses the cross section of enterprises at the outset of each enterprise.  
The estimated coefficients on the entrepreneur’s schooling and prior experience in marketing 
are positive and significant, which indicates that a highly educated entrepreneur with 
marketing experience was more likely to start a company than a less educated entrepreneur 
without marketing experience.  It is little wonder that the coefficient on the prior experience 
in electrical fittings production is insignificant, because persons with production experience 
are plentifully available in the cluster.  These results concerning the association between 
human capital and the initial enterprise status are consistent with Hypothesis 1.  The 
coefficients on the next two variables, which are proxies for social capital, are positive and 
significant.  Moreover, the two proxies for access to finance have positive and significant 
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coefficients as well, and the significance level of the coefficient on the father’s occupation 
variable is particularly high.  These results are also consistent with Hypothesis 1.10     
Columns (2) and (3) show similar results.  In column (2), the probit model is applied to 
the enterprise status in 2008.  In column (3), an ordered probit model is estimated by using 
pooled data including the four years under study.   In the model in column (3), ordered 
responses take the values of 0 for the subcontracting workshops, 1 for the subcontractor-
turned-companies, and 2 for the companies.  The explanatory variables with significant 
coefficients in column (1) have generally significant coefficients in columns (2) and (3) as 
well.  In addition, the years of operation, a variable related to specific human capital, has a 
positive and highly significant coefficient in columns (2) and (3).  The overall results shown 
in Table 4 lend strong support to Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 concerns the process of a subcontracting workshop’s transformation into a 
company.  We use the Cox proportional hazard rate model to test this hypothesis.  The hazard 
rate is the conditional probability with which a subcontracting workshop will become a 
company between time t and time t + h for small h, given that it is not yet a company at time t.  
The model may be written as  
 
  hi(t) = h0(t)exp(Xi),                                                        
 
where hi(t) is the hazard rate for enterprise i, h0(t) is a baseline hazard function, β is a vector 
of the parameter to be estimated, and Χi is a vector of the explanatory variables.  A major 
                                                 
10 These results do not deny that entrepreneurs’ socio-economic class, which is reflected in the years 
of schooling and the father’s occupation, determines the enterprise status.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on the schooling, however, is likely to reflect the effect of human capital, given 
that three variables are included in the equation to control for the father’s influences and they have 
significant coefficients. 
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advantage of this model is that it can be estimated without specifying the distributional form 
of the baseline hazard, h0(t), which is assumed to take a common value to all units in the 
population.  Thus, individuals’ hazard rates are proportional to the baseline hazard, and the 
logarithm of hi(t)/h0(t) is a linear function, Xi.  We assume that vector Xi is composed of the 
same explanatory variables as we have discussed above.   
Table 5 presents the estimates of the hazard model.11   In column (1), the estimation 
uses only the sub-sample consisting of the 156 enterprises that were established as 
subcontracting workshops.  Out of these 156 subcontractors, 50 managed to upgrade into 
companies in their first to 19th year.  Toward the bottom of this column, two dummy 
variables have positive and significant coefficients.  This implies that those subcontractors 
founded in the 1990s and 2000s are more likely to become companies in the following years 
than the enterprises which were founded in the 1980s or earlier. 
In column (2), the model is fitted on the entire sample including enterprises that have 
been companies from the beginning.  In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on schooling is 
positive and significant, indicating that subcontracting workshops run by highly educated 
entrepreneurs have a higher probability of upgrading than other subcontracting workshops.  
The coefficients on marketing experience, the father’s occupation, and the father’s 
involvement in the same industry are positive and highly significant in column (2) but either 
insignificant or only marginally significant in column (1).  These differences between the two 
columns may come from the fact that the sample used in column (2) includes the 76 
enterprises that were companies from the beginning.  In other words, the higher significance 
levels of the coefficients on marketing experience, social capital, and access to finance in 
                                                 
11 More specifically, we employ Efron’s method to handle ties to obtain an accurate approximation of 
the exact marginal likelihood (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  If an enterprise was founded as a 
company, we treat this as if its transformation to a company took place in the first year rather than at 
time 0. 
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column (2) suggest that these variables are important for the determination of initial status but 
not for subsequent upgrading.  Instead, the major factor for upgrading is the entrepreneur’s 
general human capital.  These results are highly consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
According to Hypothesis 3, enterprise size is more closely associated with the 
entrepreneur’s human capital, personal connections, and financial wealth if the enterprise is a 
company than if the enterprise size is a subcontractor.  To test this hypothesis, a function 
explaining the enterprise size is estimated separately for companies and subcontractors.  This, 
however, poses the problem of self selection because whether an enterprise is a company or a 
subcontractor is endogenous.  We thus employ the Heckman two-step estimator.  The first 
step is the estimation of a discrete choice model of enterprise status, of which the results are 
shown in Table 4 above.  The second step is the regression of enterprise size on the inverse 
Mills ratio and the same explanatory variables as in the regressions discussed above.  Since 
the coefficients of the function may change over time, we first fitted the model to data from 
each of the four years separately.  The estimated coefficients turn out to be stable so Table 6 
reports only the estimates obtained from the pooled data for the four years.12   
Table 6 classifies the enterprises into companies, subcontractor-turned-companies, and 
subcontracting workshops.  The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the estimates of the 
ordered probit model shown in column (3) of Table 4.  The dependent variable is the log of 
the number of workers in the first three columns and the subcontracting ratio in the last three 
columns.  Since the subcontracting ratio has a positive probability mass at zero, the tobit 
model is employed in the last three columns.   
                                                 
12 Although the data set is of a panel, the fixed- or random-effects model is not applied because all the 
explanatory variables are essentially time invariant.  Instead, we employ the cluster sandwich 
estimator of variance to allow for the within-group correlation. 
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For the companies, schooling, years of operation, the number of friends and relatives in 
the same industry, and the father’s occupation have positive and significant coefficients, as 
shown in columns (1) and (4).  The coefficients on these variables are smaller and less 
significant for the subcontractor-turned companies, as shown in columns (2) and (5), and 
even smaller or less significant for subcontractors, as shown in columns (3) and (6).  
Similarly, the association between subcontracting and marketing experience is much closer in 
column (4) than in column (6).  These results lend support to Hypothesis 3.   
While the coefficient on marketing experience is positive and significant in the 
subcontracting ratio function, it is negative and insignificant in the employment size function.  
A possible reason is that entrepreneurs with marketing experience are more extroverted and 
able to control subcontractors than other entrepreneurs.  Interestingly, the dummy variable for 
father in high-income occupation has a negative and significant coefficient in the 
subcontracting ratio function.  Also the coefficient on the own share of initial investment is 
negative and significant in columns (4) and (5).  It seems that the initial access to finance 
does not help entrepreneurs to expand their employment size and tends to discourage them 
from the extensive use of subcontractors.   
Robustness Checks  
As noted earlier, many companies are dependent on local traders for marketing their 
products to outside traders.  The proportion of direct sales to total sales may be used as a 
proxy for the degree of independence in terms of marketing.  This proportion is expected to 
be higher if the company has a better reputation for producing good products.  Hence, this 
proportion should be positively associated with social capital.  To check the relevance of the 
social capital variables that we have used, we estimate a function explaining the direct sales 
proportion.  We would also like to examine what factors are associated with enterprise 
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survival.  Our discussion of enterprise performance has centered on enterprise size, and our 
measures of enterprise size are limited to the number of workers and the subcontracting ratio.  
Survival is another aspect of performance.  Thus, the examination of survival is expected to 
serve as a robustness check.  
The first two columns of Table 7 present the estimates of a two-limit tobit model 
explaining the direct sales proportion.  The two-limit model is used because the direct sales 
proportion has positive probability mass at 0 and 1.  The model is fit to the data of the 
companies.  We first used separate cross sections in each of the four years and found that the 
estimates changed over time and that the estimates in 2006 and 2008 are intermediate 
between those in 2004 and 2009.  Thus, we report only the latter two sets of estimates in 
columns (1) and (2).  From these columns, it is clear that both human capital variables are 
closely related with the direct sales proportion and so is the dummy variable for father in a 
high-income occupation.  More importantly, the coefficients on the social capital variables 
are positive and significant, especially in 2009.  Thus, it is fair to say that our social capital 
variables do a good job.   
Between the enterprise surveys in 2008 and 2009, 18 enterprises exited the industry.  A 
probit model is applied to the whole sample obtained in 2008.  The dependent variable is 
unity if the enterprise was closed in 2009 and zero if it was still operating in 2009.  The 
estimation results are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7.  The two columns differ in 
that column (4) includes the logarithm of the number of workers in 2008.  The negative and 
marginally significant coefficient on this variable indicates that larger enterprises are less 
likely to exit.   In other respects, the two columns look similar.  In both columns, the 
coefficients on the years of operation, marketing experience, and the number of friends and 
relatives in the same industry are negative and significant.  These results are highly consistent 
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with the results shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6 as well as with the first two columns of Table 7.  
Hence, they increase our confidence in the results of our hypothesis testing. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This study has found that while social capital is one of the major factors closely 
associated with the performance of independent enterprises in an industrial cluster, it is not as 
closely associated with the performance of subcontractors.  It is also found that 
subcontractors have the same chance of transforming their businesses into independent 
enterprises, regardless of prior marketing experience, personal connections in the industry, 
and access to finance.    These findings indicate that subcontracting provides an incubation 
period for new entrants with unfavorable endowments of special human capital, social capital, 
and financial capital.   
A number of industrial clusters in developing countries have been stagnant.  One might 
think that the stagnancy arises because either the rate of new entry or the rate of improvement 
in product quality and productivity is substantially below the socially optimal level.  The 
findings of this paper suggest that the entry of new enterprises to industrial clusters is 
unlikely to be grossly suboptimal.  In the Sargodha cluster, a few relatively large companies 
have been attempting to introduce advanced technologies from China and elsewhere, but it is 
too early to observe any effects.  Many other clusters in Asia and Africa have faced similar 
problems of stagnancy after experiencing the entry of new enterprises.  Policy efforts should 
thus be directed to improvements in product quality and productivity, such as the provision of 
training in production and quality management.  Such training may be subsidized until 
entrepreneurs recognize the value management knowledge.  Entrepreneurial investments may 
also be encouraged by strengthening formal market institutions, which would reduce market 
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transaction costs.  Our findings, however, are suggestive rather than definite evidence.  The 
difficulty with social capital lies in its invisibility.  Our data do not clearly isolate the impacts 
of social capital from those of human capital and financial capital.  Moreover, it is difficult to 
determine to what extent the findings of this study of the electrical fitting industry in Punjab 
can be applicable to other societies.  However, the findings of this paper do warrant 
considerable further studies in these directions.     
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Table 1. Number of new entrants and their initial capital by enterprise status 
  
Enterprises established as  
Companies  Subcontracting workshops 
No. of 
enterprises 
Initial 
investment 
(1000 Rupees) 
 
No. of 
enterprises 
Initial 
investment 
(1000 Rupees) 
  
Up to 1980 6 335  3 78 
1981-1990 13 467  18 82 
1991-2000 23 383  46 114 
2001-2008 34 382  89 60 
Total 76     156   
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Table 2. Years of operation, employment, and subcontracting by enterprise status 
 
  
Companies Subcontractor-
turned-companies 
Subcontracting 
workshops 
Number of observations 76 50 106 
    
Years of operation in 2008 11.0 12.2 6.0 
Years spent as subcontractor before 
turning into companies 
0 6.6 -- 
    
Number of workers in 2008 16.2 9.6 6.4 
% production subcontracted in 2008 37.2 21.6 5.0 
 Companies Subcontracting 
workshops 
Number of workers in 2004 14.6 6.2 
Number of workers in 2008 14.5 6.4 
   
% production subcontracted in 2004 21.2 3.0 
% production subcontracted in 2008 31.0 5.0 
   
% direct sales in 2004 68.5  
% direct sales in 2008 72.4  
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Table 3. Mean characteristics of entrepreneurs by enterprise status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Companies Subcontractor-
turned-
companies 
Subcontracting 
workshops 
Exits between 
the surveys 
Years of schooling 9.7 7.7 6.2  3.8 
Years of prior experience in 
marketing 
3.4  1.1  0.1  0.4 
Years of prior experience in 
producing electrical fittings 
products 
3.3  6.0  5.0 7.8 
Dummy = 1 if father is or was 
in the same industry 
0.11 0.02 0.01 0.06 
Number of friends and relatives 
in same industry 
4.1 1.9 0.8 0.4 
Dummy = 1 if father is or was  
    in high-income occupation 
0.75 0.42 0.17 0.06 
Entrepreneur's share of initial 
investment finance (%) 
49.5 60.8 69.1 54.4 
Father’s share of initial 
investment finance (%) 
45.1 26.7 13.5 22.2 
Age at time of entry 30.8 30.0 31.7 32.2 
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Table 4. Estimated discrete choice models of determination of enterprise status 
The marginal effect estimates are reported in columns (1) and (2), while the estimated coefficients are 
reported in (3).  In the ordered probit model in (3), ordered response, y, is equal to 1 for a 
subcontracting workshop, y = 2 for a subcontractor-turned-company, and y = 3 for a company.  While 
data in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009 are pooled in (3), neither fixed- nor random-effects specification 
is used because explanatory variables are time invariant.  Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  *, 
**, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Probit model for a 
company rather 
than a subcontractor 
when founded. 
Cross section  
Probit model for a 
company rather than 
a subcontractor in 
2008. 
Cross section 
Ordered probit model 
for a company, a sub-
con-turned-company, 
or a subcontractor. 
Pooled data 
Years of schooling 0.027** 0.028** 0.040*** 
 (2.48) (2.40) (7.95) 
Years of operation in 2008  0.022*** 0.030*** 
  (3.24) (5.10) 
Prior marketing experience  0.300*** 0.287*** 0.252*** 
 (2.74) (2.64) (6.56) 
Prior experience of electrical  -0.064 0.011 -0.012 
fittings production (-0.79) (0.10) (-1.28) 
Number of friends and  0.021* 0.036** 0.042*** 
relatives in same industry (1.87) (2.11) (5.22) 
Father in same industry 0.496** 0.334*** 0.577*** 
 (2.55) (3.95) (5.36) 
Father in high-income  0.346*** 0.380*** 0.383*** 
occupation (4.22) (5.02) (4.49) 
Entrepreneur and his father's  0.003* 0.001 0.003** 
share of initial investment (1.75) (1.07) (2.07) 
Entrepreneur's age at time of  0.006   
    founding (1.27)   
Entrepreneur's age  0.003 0.008 
  (0.68) (1.44) 
Year 2006 dummy   -0.057 
   (-0.42) 
Year 2008 dummy   -0.501 
   (-0.37) 
Year 2009 dummy   -0.079 
   (-0.58) 
Dummy for establishment in  -0.121   
    the 1990s (-1.16)   
Dummy for establishment in  -0.111   
    the 2000s (-0.99)   
Intercept -2.865*** -2.276***  
   (-3.55) (-3.35)  
Chi-Square 116.25 128.01 487.86 
Number of observations 232 232 822 
%  subcons correctly predicted  65.4 65.1 56.4 
%  companies correctly predicted  59.2 69.1 60.1 
%  subcon-companies correct   62.8 
%  total correct predictions 63.4 67.2 59.0 
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Table 5. Estimated Cox proportional hazard models fitted on upgrading from subcontractors 
to independent enterprises 
 (1) (2) 
 
Enterprises established as 
subcontracting workshops 
All sample enterprises 
   
Years of schooling 0.118*** 0.092*** 
 (2.58) (3.11) 
Prior marketing experience  0.641 0.778*** 
 (1.17) (3.27) 
Prior experience of electrical  0.368 0.037 
fittings production (0.78) (0.17) 
Number of friends and relatives  0.047 0.023* 
in same industry (0.97) (1.70) 
Father in same industry 1.864 1.075*** 
 (1.57) (2.77) 
Father in high-income occupation 0.610* 0.949*** 
 (1.69) (4.20) 
Entrepreneur and his father's  0.003 0.005 
share of initial investment (0.64) (1.30) 
Entrepreneur's age at time of founding -0.013 -0.006 
 (-0.67) (-0.48) 
Dummy for establishment in  0.846* 0.229 
    the 1990s (1.74) (0.79) 
Dummy for establishment in  1.107** 0.377 
    the 2000s (2.01) (1.24) 
    
Chi-square 23.31 108.83 
Log likelihood  -188.54 -545.85 
Number of observations 156 232 
The dependent variable is the log hazard ratio.  The reported estimates are not the marginal effect but 
the coefficients of the model.  The model in column (1) uses the sample of enterprises that were 
established as subcontracting workshops, while the model in column (2) uses the entire sample.  
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table 6. Estimated functions explaining employment size and subcontracting ratio 
In columns (4) to (6), the estimates of marginal effects are reported.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in 
column (1) to (3) and z-statistics in columns (4) and (6) based on standard errors corrected for clustering of the 
observations at the enterprise level.  *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical 
significance, respectively. 
 
  
  
Second-step OLS regression of 
ln(employment)  
Second-step tobit regression of 
subcontracting ratio 
Companies 
Subcon-
turned-
companies 
Subcon 
workshops 
Companies 
Subcon-
turned-
companies 
Subcon 
workshops 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years of schooling 0.044*** 0.030* 0.003 0.460*** 0.267** 0.218 
 (2.70) (1.78) (0.58) (2.70) (2.43) (1.27) 
Years of operation 0.071*** 0.041** 0.030** 1.763*** 1.258** 0.715 
 (5.20) (2.25) (2.53) (3.01) (2.47) (1.53) 
Prior experience in  -0.398 -0.117 -0.010 19.179*** 15.393*** 7.219** 
   marketing (-1.60) (-0.79) (-1.59) (2.81) (2.75) (2.07) 
Prior experience in -0.072 -0.086 -0.627 -0.271 -0.304 -0.159 
   production  (-0.68) (-1.47) (-0.84) (-0.98) (-0.82) (-1.18) 
No. friends and  relatives 0.020*** 0.013* 0.003 0.804 0.712 0.082 
   in the same trade (3.02) (1.74) (0.31) (0.79) (0.71) (0.45) 
Father in same trade 0.240* 0.156* 0.144 0.889 0.761 0.175 
 (1.81) (1.73) (0.72) (1.63) (0.51) (1.35) 
Father in high  0.029 0.023 -0.001 -6.152*** -4.169* -1.238* 
   income occupation (0.78) (0.20) (-0.06) (-3.34) (-1.94) (-1.81) 
Own share in initial 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.190* -0.113* -0.052 
   investment (0.73) (1.19) (0.88) (-1.99) (-1.70) (-1.18) 
Entrepreneur's age 0.012 0.000 -0.004 0.171 -0.269 0.067 
 (1.02) (0.05) (-1.47) (0.53) (-0.73) (1.35) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.716 0.311 0.208 0.823 0.698 0.946 
 (1.58) (0.84) (0.52) (1.47) (0.95) (1.13) 
Year 2006 dummy -0.061 -0.033 -0.018 3.347* 2.112 0.019 
 (-0.42) (-0.23) (-0.28) (1.73) (1.37) (0.04) 
Year 2008 dummy -0.218 -0.082 -0.051 5.231** 3.522* 3.258 
 (-1.48) (-0.60) (-0.71) (2.04) (1.73) (0.86) 
Year 2009 dummy -0.167 -0.052 -0.013 7.063*** 3.249*** 2.769* 
 (-1.14) (-0.39) (-0.20) (3.35) (2.85) (1.81) 
Intercept 0.623** 0.518** 0.669* -14.959 -10.436 -25.331 
 (2.35) (2.50) (1.94) (-0.58) (-0.72) (-1.50) 
Number of obs.  281 172 369 281 172 369 
   left-censored obs.    61 60 251 
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Table 7. Estimated Tobit model of direct sales proportion and probit model of exits 
  
Direct sales 
 (two limit tobit) 
Exit 
(probit) 
2004 2009   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years of schooling 0.492** 0.614*** -0.014** -0.009* 
 (2.31) (2.88) (-2.15) (-1.89) 
Years of operation  0.173* 0.228*** -0.064** -0.017** 
 (1.68) (3.87) (-1.98) (-2.03) 
Prior marketing experience  9.438*** 7.121*** -0.108*** -0.101** 
 (3.79) (3.76) (-2.94) (-2.37) 
Prior experience of electrical       0.422 0.875 0.027 0.001 
fittings production (0.28) (0.33) (0.88) (1.16) 
Number of friends & relatives     0.367* 0.405** -0.009* -0.006* 
in same industry (1.78) (2.25) (-1.93) (-1.86) 
Father in same industry 3.394 4.342** 0.055 0.037 
 (1.27) (2.39) (0.44) (0.95) 
Father in high-income  1.056 1.989** -0.029 0.003 
  occupation (1.42) (2.48) (-0.86) (1.03) 
Entrepreneur and his father's    0.047 -0.005 -0.000 0.000 
  share in initial investment (0.63) (-0.44) (-0.56) (0.66) 
Entrepreneur's age at the time of 0.031 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
  founding (0.37) (0.10) (-0.60) (-0.49) 
ln(the number of workers in 2008)    -0.068* 
    (-1.70) 
Intercept -129.79 -93.22 0.260 0.371 
 (-1.05) (-1.12) (0.28) (0.89) 
Pseudo R-square  0.1891 0.2098   
Chi-square for probit   18.2 26.6 
Number of observations 91 125 232 232 
Number of left censored obs.  17 14   
Number of right censored obs.  44 60   
In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes only the companies.   In columns (3) and (4), the whole 
sample is used.  The estimates reported are the marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-
statistics.  *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Subcontracting and marketing relationships 
 
Notes: 
             indicates those who enter into putting-out contracts.   A household 
subcontractor receives parts and materials from and delivers assembled 
products to a company or a subcontracting workshop.  A subcontracting 
workshop receives raw materials from and delivers finished products to a 
company or a local trader. 
              indicates a marketing channel.   Companies sell finished products to local 
traders or directly to outside buyers.  Local traders sell finished products to 
carpenters or consumers directly or through traders outside the city.  
 
Traders outside Sargodha 
Local Traders 
Companies 
Subcontracting Workshops 
Household Subcontractors 
